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Abstract
While incongruence with the background context is a powerful cue for
irony, in spoken conversation ironic utterances often bear non-contextual
cues, such as marked tone of voice and/or facial expression. In Experiment
1, we show that ironic prosody and facial expression can be correctly discrim-
inated as such in a categorization task, even though the boundaries between
ironic and non-ironic cues are somewhat fuzzy. However, an act-out task
(Experiments 2 & 3) reveals that prosody and facial expression are consider-
ably less reliable cues for irony comprehension than contextual incongruence.
Reaction time and eye-tracking data indicate that these non-contextual cues
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entail a trade-off between accuracy and processing speed. These results sug-
gest that interpreters privilege frugal, albeit less reliable pragmatic heuristics
over costlier, but more reliable, contextual processing.
Keywords: irony; figurative language; prosody; facial expression; context;
eye-tracking
Introduction1
Imagine that, as you announce that you will not attend a crisis meeting2
because of a party, your boss replies ‘I love your sense of responsibility!’.3
Most likely, the incongruity of her comment with the conversational context4
– broadly understood as shared background knowledge or beliefs (in the clas-5
sic sense of Stalnaker, 2002) – will (correctly) prompt you to interpret it as6
ironic. While such ironic utterances pervade our daily conversations, irony is7
notoriously difficult to define in precise terms (e.g. Gibbs, 2000; Gibbs & Col-8
ston, 2012, p. 52) and surfaces under many different guises (such as sarcasm,9
jocularity, hyperbole, rhetorical question, and understatement). Neverthe-10
less, in one sense or another, all ironically intended messages deliberately11
mismatch the utterance literal content.112
Incongruence with the background context, of the kind just illustrated,13
is a powerful cue for irony (Gerrig & Goldvarg, 2000; Kreuz & Link, 2002).14
However, there are indications that a statement may still be interpreted as15
ironic in the absence of such contextual incongruity, provided that other cues16
1 Of course, contextual incongruence does not necessarily boil down to manifest falsity;
for instance, hyperbolic, but nevertheless literally true statements may be ironic (Sperber
& Wilson, 1981; Kreuz & Roberts, 1995).
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are available (e.g. Kowatch et al., 2013; Jacob et al., 2016). In particular,17
spoken ironic utterances are often associated with a specific facial expression18
and a distinctive prosody (e.g. Attardo et al., 2003; Rankin et al., 2009). To19
the extent that such cues to irony do not directly rely on background context,20
in what follows we will dub them ‘non-contextual’, as opposed to contextual21
incongruity.22
The precise role non-contextual cues play in irony processing remains23
ill understood. On one hand, there is some evidence that a global ironic24
prosody can be correctly discriminated from a non-ironic one (Bryant &25
Fox Tree, 2005), provided that the statement is uttered in a familiar language26
(Cheang & Pell, 2011). And, in fact, many experimental designs implicitly27
presuppose that ironic prosody is efficient, as they use a distinctive prosody to28
contrast between ironic and literal stimuli (e.g. Chevallier et al., 2011; Colich29
et al., 2012; Kowatch et al., 2013). On the other hand, Bryant & Fox Tree30
(2005) report that a prosodic contour that is successfully discriminated as31
ironic is also perceptually associated with other dimensions, such as anger32
or inquisitiveness. Furthermore, the perception of a given prosodic contour33
as ironic or not may be influenced by the contextual availability of an ironic34
interpretation (Voyer et al., 2016).35
We submit that while ironic tone of voice and/or ironic facial expression36
may be correctly discriminated, these cues are not necessarily efficient in a37
genuine process of irony comprehension. Arguably, successful social interac-38
tions do not reduce to tagging statements as literal or not (viz. discrimina-39
tion), but require the identification of the speaker’s discourse goals, and the40
selection of an appropriate reaction (viz. comprehension; see Kreuz 2000).41
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Studies in brain-damaged patients suggest a dissociation between these two42
processes: some patients fail to understand the speaker’s intent when contex-43
tual and prosody cues are available, even though they are able to identify the44
tone of voice as sarcastic (McDonald, 2000; McDonald & Pearce, 1996). Yet,45
irony processing is usually investigated through tasks in which participants46
have to judge as quickly as possible if statements are ironic or not, thus mea-47
suring only the discrimination component. For instance, Bryant & Fox Tree48
(2002) found that participants successfully discriminate ironic vs. non-ironic49
utterances based on their prosody.2 However, making decisions in a binary,50
forced-choice task is very different from interpreting a message in the same51
way as would its actual addressee. The precise role of prosody within irony52
comprehension is further blurred by the fact that Bryant & Fox Tree (2002)53
found context to be a more powerful cue for ironic judgements than prosody.54
A notable exception to such metalinguistic decision paradigms is the55
study by Kowatch et al. (2013), who designed an innovative ‘shopping task’56
that positions participants as active interpreters. In this experimental design,57
a puppet faces food items (e.g. an apple and an orange) and utters literal or58
ironic statements about what it wants to buy (e.g. ‘I just love apples’). Only59
the puppet’s tone of voice allows to disentangle ironic criticisms (e.g. ‘I just60
love apples’), literal criticisms (e.g. ‘I just hate apples’) and literal praise61
(e.g. ‘I just love oranges’). Participants are asked to put in a shopping cart62
the food item the puppet really wants. In this way, participants’ response63
2 There are many other experimental studies that approach irony exclusively through
discrimination; see, for instance, Kreuz & Roberts (1995); Climie & Pexman (2008); Epley
et al. (2004); Chevallier et al. (2011); Colich et al. (2012).
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mirrors their interpretation of the discourse goals of the speaker. The results64
of Kowatch et al. (2013) display an interesting asymmetry between accuracy65
and reaction time. The rate of correct responses for ironic items is low (less66
than 60%), and significantly so relative to literal items. At the same time,67
the authors report no difference in processing time or in frequencies of first68
looks to the correct object for ironic and literal criticisms. It could be the69
case, then, that while ironic prosody and/or facial expression are not very70
reliable for accurately grasping an ironic communicative intention, they still71
prompt a rapid, cognitively shallow attribution of ironic intentions to the72
speaker.73
Importantly, Kowatch et al. (2013) did not compare ironic prosody rel-74
ative to the role of context, so it is unclear whether interpreters still use75
prosody when context is available, and if yes, whether non-contextual cues76
merely complement context-based processing or whether they may take prece-77
dence over it. There is ample evidence that mastery of irony presupposes78
complex mental-state attribution skills (e.g. Akimoto et al., 2012; Bryant,79
2012; Spotorno & Noveck, 2014). Such mentalising processes require inferring80
the speaker’s intention by assessing the utterance content against the back-81
ground context. Some theorists hold that any type of pragmatic processing82
involves complex, context-based inferences about the speaker’s communica-83
tive intentions (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Consistently with this idea, in 5- to84
7-year-old children, it is the capacity to attribute multilayered mental states,85
and not ironic prosody, that predicts correct discrimination between irony86
and white lies (Wimmer & Leekam, 1991; see also Filippova & Astington,87
2010).88
5
However, it is also plausible that conversationally experienced interpreters89
sometimes rely more on salient non-contextual cues than on context. For in-90
stance, Deliens et al. (2017) recently found that in the presence of salient91
ironic prosody, participants do not engage in context-based perspective-92
shifting to gauge the sarcastic nature of a message. According to the parallel-93
constraint-satisfaction account (Katz, 2005; Pexman, 2008), all cues are pro-94
cessed in parallel and activate a certain – possibly ironic – interpretation.95
However, as acknowledged by Pexman (2008) herself, this model does not96
currently provide any indication as to the relative weight of different cues.97
A more radical idea, to which we subscribe, is that the presence of salient,98
albeit perhaps less reliable, non-contextual cues prompts interpreters to dis-99
regard costlier contextual processing. This hypothesis is consistent with the100
Direct Access view (e.g. Gibbs, 2002), which predicts that interpreters do101
not always need to analyse literal meaning in full to form a hypothesis about102
the meaning communicated by the speaker. It is also in line with a model103
of pragmatics according to which interpreters are driven by considerations104
of cognitive economy, and do not necessarily engage in extensive context-105
driven reasoning about speaker’s intentions (Kissine, 2016; see also Ferreira106
& Patson, 2007).107
By contrast, Giora’s Graded Salience theory (Giora, 2003; Giora et al.,108
2015) holds that, unless the sentence form bears a conventional or by-default109
association with irony,3 utterance literal, compositional meaning will nec-110
3 So far, evidence for such by-default ironic meanings, outside conventionally ironic
constructions, is limited to negative statements of the form ‘X is not the most Y’ (Giora
et al., 2015).
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essarily be activated first before being rejected in favor of a contextually111
computed ironic interpretation. On different grounds, authors like Sperber112
& Wilson (2002), who hold that any pragmatic processing involves context-113
based inference of speaker’s intentions, would also have to predict that non-114
contextual cues can supplement, but not replace context in irony compre-115
hension.116
Summing up, two related research questions clearly emerge from the cur-117
rent state of the art: one about the reliability of non-contextual cues, and118
the other about the relative processing roles of contextual and non-contextual119
cues. In Experiment 1 of this paper we assess the discrimination of ironic120
prosody relative to neutral prosody, as well as to positive or negative literal121
prosody; we also test, in the exact same way, the discriminability of ironic122
facial expression. (While the discrimination of ironic prosody has been previ-123
ously investigated, to the best of our knowledge no such evidence is available124
for ironic facial expression.) In Experiments 2 and 3 we assess how the same125
prosody and facial cues, as well as contextual information impact irony com-126
prehension, using an act-out task inspired by Kowatch et al. (2013). Our127
Hypothesis 1 is that in a categorization task ironic prosody and ironic facial128
expression should allow correct discrimination of ironic items. In line with the129
model put forward by Kissine (2016), as well as with the Direct Access view130
(Gibbs, 2002), we predict that in the act-out tasks of Experiments 2 and 3131
the presence of salient – albeit potentially less reliable – non-contextual cues132
should prompt interpreters to bypass costlier contextual processing. That133
is, our Hypothesis 2 is that ironic prosody and facial expression are privi-134
leged in irony comprehension at the expense of costlier, but more accurate135
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assessment of the utterance literal content relative to the context. Accord-136
ingly, one should expect non-contextual cues to be associated with faster137
responses; furthermore, if, as we predict, the processing of ironic prosody or138
facial expression does not supplement context-based assessment of the com-139
positional meaning, non-contextual cues should not entail any accuracy gain140
relative to contextual incongruence.141
Our Hypothesis 2 may also be seen as one possible implementation of142
the parallel-constraint-satisfaction model of irony interpretation (Katz, 2005;143
Pexman, 2008). As we already mentioned, this model predicts that contex-144
tual and non-contextual cues are processed in parallel. If parallel processing145
of all cues must be completed before the outputs are weighted and the fi-146
nal interpretation reached, then, contrary to our predictions, the presence of147
non-contextual cues along with contextual incongruence should lead to longer148
reaction times. However, the parallel-constraint-satisfaction model could also149
assign greater weight to non-contextual cues, in such a way that costlier pro-150
cesses terminate before completion in the presence of salient ironic prosody151
or facial expression. In that case, this model would be entirely consistent152
with our predictions.153
By contrast, the predictions generated by our Hypothesis 2 are incom-154
patible with accounts that posit obligatory processing of contextual cues in155
irony derivation. According to Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 2002)156
or the Graded Salience theory (Giora, 2003), ironic interpretation necessarily157
involves the assessment of the utterance content against the background con-158
text.4 If so, non-contextual cues would merely add a supplementary source of159
4 Again, with the possible proviso concerning conventional or by-default ironic meanings
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evidence for (or against) ironic interpretation, the integration of which should160
lead to increased response times – especially if these cues are not entirely161
congruent with context-based processing. Furthermore, if non-contextual162
cues supplement obligatory context-based processing, accuracy levels should163
increase when ironic prosody or facial expression combine with contextual164
incongruence.165
Experimental stimuli166
All experiments reported in this paper use (part of) thirty-six videos (and167
two practice trials videos) in French, in which two individuals discuss two168
items placed on the table in front of them. Each video can be subdivided169
in (a) a context segment, (b) a labeling and question segment, (c) a pause170
segment and (d) the target utterance. First, the character (A) at the right171
of the screen mentions her/his knowledge about the second character’s (B)172
preferences regarding the two items placed on the table (e.g. ‘George, I173
know that you like chemistry and that you really hate physics. But reading174
a physics book could be interesting.’). This part contains contextual back-175
ground information useful for detecting potential sarcasm. Second, A labels176
the two items on the table to ensure participants could identify them (e.g.177
‘Here is a chemistry book and here is a physics book.’) and then asks B178
if s/he wants one of the two items (e.g. ‘Would you like the physics book179
as a gift, now?’). Third, a black screen appears and participants are asked180
to press the space bar to hear B’s reply. Fourth, a video appears with B’s181
(Giora et al., 2015); see footnote 3.
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reply, viz. the target (e.g. ‘No, you know how much I hate physics!’). In182
Experiments 2 and 3 the video freezes until the participant selects the item183
she believes B really wants. Clicking the right mouse button corresponds to184
the object at the right of the screen and clicking the left mouse button to the185
object at the left of the screen. Time course of a video stimulus is illustrated186
in Figure 1.187
Figure 1: Time course of a full stimulus
The thirty-six videos are drawn on twelve scenarios (see Figure 2). There188
are three versions of each scenario based on the meaning of the target: an189
Ironic, a Literal Yes and a Literal No version (see Table 1 for a translated190
example of the three versions of a scenario). The meaning of the target was191
manipulated by modifying the contextual information (B’s preferences are192
congruent vs. incongruent with B’s reply) and the beginning of the target193
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(‘Yes, you know how much I like X’ vs. ‘No, you know how much I hate X’).194
Three professional actors formed three pairs (actor 1 and 2, actor 1 and 3,195
actor 2 and 3). Each actor performed in 12 videos, 6 as individual A and 6196
as individual B.
LITERAL NO IRONIC LITERAL YES
Context George, I know that you like drink-
ing milk and that you really don’t like
drinking tea for breakfast.
But some kinds of tea are really nice.
George, I know
that you like tea
for breakfast and
you have said this
to me many times.
Label &
Question
George, here is a glass of milk and here is a cup of green
tea. Would you like the cup of green tea with your break-
fast, now?
Target No, you know how
much I hate tea for
breakfast!
Yes, you know how much I like tea for
breakfast!
Table 1: Example of three versions (Literal No, Ironic and Literal Yes) of a scenario
197
Each video vignette was assigned to one of 6 conditions defined in func-198
tion of the presence or the absence of specific cues: Context only, Prosody199
only, Context & Prosody, Context & Facial expression, Prosody & Facial200
expression, and Context, Prosody & Facial expression. In conditions where201
contextual cues were not available, the context segment of the video was202
removed. In the conditions where the prosodic cues were not available, the203
actor was asked to utter the target sentence on a monotonous tone of voice.204
By contrast, when prosody cues were present, the actor was instructed to205
utter the target sentence with the corresponding prosody (literal positive for206
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Literal Yes items, literal negative for Literal No items and ironic for Ironic207
items). The same applies to facial expression cues. Each target is thus as-208
sociated with one of the four following prosody contours and one of four209












































Figure 2: Assignment of the 36 experimental videos across conditions. Contextual cue
(C), Prosody cue (P), Facial expression cue (F)
Recall that our overarching objective is to disentangle potentially differ-211
ential roles of contextual and non-contextual cues in irony processing. In212
order to do so, one should avoid using stimuli whose ironic character is in-213
herently difficult to grasp, as this would entail a markedly low accuracy on a214
sub-set of items. This is why, as in Kowatch et al. (2013), our ironic stimuli215
always consist of negative meanings associated with literally positive sen-216
tences (‘Yes’ sentences; see Table 1); utterances of the opposite valence —217
literally negative sentences with a positive ironic meaning — are much less218
canonical forms of irony, and have been found to be particularly difficult to219
grasp (e.g. Kreuz & Link, 2002; Climie & Pexman, 2008; Filippova & Asting-220
ton, 2010). For a similar reason, no item is associated with Facial expression221
as the only cue towards the (non-)ironic meaning. A marked facial expres-222
sion with no context support and combined with a neutral prosody would be223
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too an unnatural and ambiguous cue, and would increase the risk of chance224
performance.225
It is possible that the most salient acoustic correlates of ironic prosody are226
not intrinsic, but rather relative to the surrounding discourse (Bryant, 2010).227
However, ironic prosody has also been reported to have inherent acoustic228
correlates at the level of fundamental frequency (F0), intensity and delivery229
rate (e.g. Rockwell, 2000; Bryant, 2010; Anolli et al., 2000; Lœvenbruck et al.,230
2013). For all target segments, F0 (in Hz, every 3 ms), intensity (in dB, every231
11 ms) and syllable duration (in ms) were measured using Praat (Boersma &232
Weenink, 2017). A linear regression implemented in the lmer package (Bates233
et al., 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2016) reveals that only mean intensity234
predicts the type of prosody (F (3, 32) = 6.84; p = 0.001; all other ps> 0.3).235
Because the first word of the target is always a monosyllabic yes (oui) or236
no (non), it made sense to assess whether ironic prosody is reflected in its237
acoustic properties. For first syllables of target utterances, we found an effect238
of prosody type on the mean intensity (F (3, 32) = 4.472, p = 0.001) and of239
syllable length (F (3, 32) = 8.586, p < 0.001). As can be seen from Table 2,240
the ironic prosody of our stimuli is associated with a significantly higher mean241
intensity in the whole sentence and in the first syllable in comparison with242
all other prosody types, and with significantly longer first syllable relative to243
Neutral prosody.244
In an attempt to objectify differences in facial expressions, five compo-245
nents have been analyzed during the target sentence: eyes, mouth, eyebrows,246
head and upper body. If there was at least one movement in a component247








Intercept (Ironic) 73.48∗∗∗ 71.54∗∗∗ 553.50∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.96) (41.34)
Literal Yes −3.35∗∗ −4.22∗∗ −106.37
(1.11) (1.36) (58.47)
Literal No −3.68∗∗ −0.31 −102.50
(1.11) (1.36) (58.47)
Neutral −4.43∗∗∗ −2.64∗ −261.33∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.24) (53.38)
R2 0.39 0.30 0.45
Adj. R2 0.33 0.23 0.39
Num. obs. 36 36 36
F statistic 6.84 4.47 8.59
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Coefficients (and standard errors) of linear regressions of mean intensity (whole
sentence and first syllable) and of syllable length (first syllable) on prosody Type
it was scored as 0. A total facial expression score (ranging from 0 to 5) for249
an item is then the sum of the five component scores. Actors have been250
consistent in their way to display emotions. For neutral facial expressions251
(n = 18), they all kept still (m = 0.28, sd = 0.57). For marked facial ex-252
pressions (ironic or literal, n = 18), actors were all using combinations of253
different movements (m = 2.94, sd = 1.26). An ordinal regression imple-254
mented in the clm function from the ordinal package (Christensen, 2015) in255
R (R Core Team, 2016) reveals a significant effect of video category (Marked256
vs. Neutral facial expression; z = 34.98, p < 0.001) with a higher number257
of component movements in the Marked facial expression condition, but no258
effect of Type (Ironic vs. Literal Yes vs. Literal No; p > 0.19).259
Further qualitative inspection reveals a difference between Marked facial260
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expressions across Types. In the Literal Yes condition, actors look enthusi-261
astic or happy: they display sincere static smile (mouth and eyes), as well262
as little and brief eyebrows upward movements. In the Literal No condi-263
tion, actors look upset or angry: they visibly accentuate plosive consonants,264
shrug and slightly project their torsos, display accentuated and long eye-265
brow raising and frowning, produce head negation movements at the syllable266
rhythm, as well as increased blinking, half-closure and a wide-open eyes. In267
the Irony condition actors look sarcastic: they produce many wide eyebrow268
upward movements, eyebrows are also often arched, they display huge false269
frozen smiles ending in a cold expression, sway their body, and produce many270
repeated wide and slow head movements.271
Experiment 1272
The aim of Experiment 1 is to assess whether prosody or facial expres-273
sions can be correctly discriminated as ironic against a sincere or neutral274
counterpart. To this end, we isolated these cues from target segments of275
our material, and ran a first experiment were participants had to rate these276
isolated cues from sincere to ironic on a 7-point Likert scale.277
Participants278
One hundred thirty-nine volunteers participated in this first experiment.279
Data from 12 participants were discarded from the analyses because they280
were not French native speakers (N=9) or due to a problem with the network281
connection during the task (N=3). The remaining 127 volunteers (63 males)282
ranged in age from 16 to 53 years (m = 26.68, sd = 7.50).283
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Procedure284
To investigate the discrimination of ironic prosody and facial expression,285
we isolated the targets of the 36 videos described in the previous section,286
and next, split them into a stand-alone audio file and a video file with muted287
sound. The resulting audio and video files all belong to one of the following288
four types: Literal Yes, Literal No, Neutral and Ironic. The 36 audio files289
and 36 video files were presented in the same randomised order across par-290
ticipants, using the online survey application LimeSurvey, with implemented291
audio and video players. The experiment was composed of two parts: the292
scoring of the facial expression and the scoring of the prosody. One group of293
participants (Group Prosody-Facial Expression: N =66, 43 males, age 16-49294
years, m = 26.06, sd = 7.04) scored first the prosody and then the facial295
expression, while the second group performed the task in the opposite or-296
der (Group Facial Expression-Prosody : N = 61, 20 males, age 19-53 years,297
m = 27.34, sd = 7.98). In the prosody part, participants were asked to listen298
to each sound excerpt and to rate the speaker’s tone of voice on a 7-point299
Likert scale ranging from (1)-‘completely sincere’ to (7)-‘completely ironic’.300
They were instructed to focus on the prosody independently from the con-301
tent of the sentence. In the facial expression part, participants were asked302
to watch each video and to rate the (left side of the screen) speaker’s facial303
expression on the same 7-point Likert scale. We pointed out that the sound304




Participants’ ratings of prosody and facial expression were analysed with308
cumulative link mixed models, using the clmm function from the ordinal309
package in R (Christensen, 2015). Here and in Experiments 2 and 3, the310
significance of the fixed effects was assessed by performing likelihood ratio311
tests in which a model containing the fixed effect is compared to another312
model without it, but with an otherwise identical structure (Baayen et al.,313
2008). Post-hoc comparisons of least square-means, with Tukey adjustment314
for multiple comparisons and Satterthwaite method for estimating degrees of315
freedom, were performed using the lsmeans package (Lenth, 2016).316
Prosody (audio data). Figure 3 displays irony rating on a (1-7) Likert scale317
per type of prosody. Cumulative link multilevel logit regressions with by-318
subject random intercepts and random slopes for the Type factor (Ironic319
vs. Literal Yes vs. Literal No vs. Neutral) revealed a significant effect320
of Type (χ2(3) = 233.18, p < 0.001), but not of Group (Prosody-Facial321
Expression vs. Facial Expression-Prosody) (p = 0.8). The model, displayed322
in Table 3, shows that Ironic prosody leads to significantly higher irony scores323
than all other types of prosody. Since, however, other levels of Type do not324
seem equivalent (see Figure 3 ), we conducted post-hoc comparisons, which325
confirmed that Literal No type was rated as significantly less ironic than326
Literal Yes (z = −16.48, p < 0.001) and Neutral (z = −17.37, p < 0.001),327
while there was no difference between Literal Yes and Neutral types (p =328
0.92).329
Facial expression (Video data). Figure 4 displays irony rating on a (1-7)330












Figure 3: Tukey box-plots for ratings of audio-files per Prosody type
regressions with by-subject random intercepts and random slopes for the332
Type factor (Ironic vs. Literal Yes vs. Neutral vs. Literal No) revealed a333
significant effect of Type (χ2(3) = 176.58, p < 0.001), but not of Group334
(Prosody-Facial Expression vs. Facial Expression-Prosody; p = 0.38). As335
shown in Table 4, Ironic facial expression prompts significantly higher irony336
scores relative to other types of facial expression. Again, Figure 4 suggests337
that not all non-ironic levels are equivalent; post-hoc comparisons show that338
Literal Yes type is judged more ironic than Neutral (z = 7.9, p < 0.001) and339
Literal No (z = 11.81, p < 0.001), and that Neutral type is judged more340
ironic than Literal No (z = 5.17, p < 0.001).341
Discussion342
Experiment 1 confirms that in a rating task that explicitly opposes ironic343
to literal stimuli, ironic prosody and facial expression can be correctly dis-344
criminated against literal (positive or negative) or neutral prosody and facial345
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Irony ratings of prosody
Literal Yes −1.38 (0.09)∗∗∗
Neutral −1.62 (0.09)∗∗∗








∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3: Coefficients (and standard errors) of fixed effects of the cumulative link multilevel
logit regressions of irony ratings on Prosody Type on irony ratings (Ironic prosody is the
reference level). The three first lines of the table report the coefficients for the predictors
included in the CLMM. Lines 4 to 9 report the coefficients for each transition of the 7-point
Likert scale.
expression. However, using a gradual Likert scale instead of a forced ‘ironic346
vs. literal’ binary choice (unlike, e.g. Bryant & Fox Tree, 2002; Voyer et al.,347
2016) allows a finer-grained insight into the identification of prosody and348
facial expression as ironic or not. Of course, ironic prosody and facial ex-349
pression led to unambiguously higher scores on an irony scale. (In the case of350
ironic prosody, such perceptual judgements thus reflect the acoustic salience351
of the stimuli intensity.) Recall, however, that our non-ironic audio and video352
stimuli fall into three different types: positive prosody/expression, negative353
prosody/expression and neutral prosody/expression. If ironic cues were com-354
pletely unambiguous, one should expect the remaining three types to receive355












Figure 4: Tukey box-plots for ratings of video-files per facial expression type
expressions were judged more ironic than their literal negative counterparts.357
In other words, positive or neutral prosody and facial expression are more358
ambiguous as to the ironic vs. sincere meaning of an utterance. Further-359
more, while ironic cues were accurately discriminated against the other ones360
as more ironic, the distinction could have been artificially boosted up by361
the fact that participants’ task is reduced to merely rating the ironic dimen-362
sion of various stimuli. In real life, however, interpreters have to decide on363
speaker’s intentions rather than classify the utterance along an ironic-literal364
continuum. It is therefore likely that, in such settings, the actual reliability365
of non-contextual cues to irony is considerably lower than what the results366
of Experiment 1 might suggest.367
Experiment 2368
The second experiment uses an act-out irony comprehension task in order369
to compare the impact of ironic prosody and facial expression relative to370
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Irony ratings of facial expressions
Literal Yes −1.42 (0.14)∗∗∗
Neutral −2.64 (0.15)∗∗∗








∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Coefficients (and standard errors) of fixed effects of the cumulative link multilevel
logit regressions of irony ratings on Facial expression Type (Ironic facial expression is the
reference level).The three first lines of the table report the coefficients for the predictors
included in the CLMM. Lines 4 to 9 report the coefficients for each transition of the 7-point
Likert scale.
that of contextual incongruence. First, we expect that, in spite of being371
correctly discriminated in Experiment 1 ironic prosody and facial expression,372
should not improve accuracy in irony comprehension relative to contextual373
incongruence. Second, in spite of not being associated with an accuracy gain374
relative to context, we expect these non-contextual cues to lead to shorter375
response times.376
Participants377
Fifty-six students gave their written informed consent to participate in378
this study approved by the Faculty Ethics Committee at the Université libre379
de Bruxelles. Participants were recruited according to the following criteria:380
native French speakers, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no hearing dif-381
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ficulties, no history of neurological disorders. Ten participants were excluded382
from statistical analyses because they were not native speakers of French.383
Two other participants were excluded because they reported a history of384
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, a neurodevelopmental disorder as-385
sociated with pragmatic deficits, including difficulties understanding irony386
(e.g. Caillies et al., 2014; Staikova et al., 2013; Bignell & Cain, 2007). The387
age of the 44 remaining participants (15 males) ranged between 18 and 26388
years (m = 20.43; sd = 1.47).389
Procedure390
The task was run in 64-bit Windows 7 using Tobii StudioTM 3.2.1 soft-391
ware, which controlled the stimuli presentation in a random order and recorded392
participant’s response and reaction times. A Tobii pro X2-60(Hz) screen-393
based eye-tracker device (Tobii Technology, Inc. Stockholm, Sweden) was394
used to record participants’ eye movements during the target sentence. A395
five-point calibration procedure designed by Tobii Studio was used before the396
irony task.397
Each participant was seated at a distance of ± 60 cm in front of a 16.5-inch398
monitor (resolution: 1920 x 1080 pixels) wearing headphones. The stimuli399
were presented at a comfortable sound pressure level (65dB ± 5dB). Follow-400
ing eye-tracker calibration, participants were presented with the following401
instructions on screen:402
In each trial of this task you will watch videos with short conver-403
sations between two individuals. One person will ask a second404
person questions about two items on a table. After each ques-405
tion, you will watch a video with the second person’s reply. Listen406
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carefully to what the first person says and to the second person’s407
reply! At the end of the second person’s answer you will have408
to give him/her the item you believe he/she really wants. You409
should press the left mouse button if you think that he/she re-410
ally wants the item at the left or the right mouse button if you411
believe that he/she really wants the item at the right. Next trial412
will start automatically after your answer.413
Participants first completed two training trials (one Literal Yes and one Lit-414
eral No item) before the experimental phase began.415
Results416
In order to assess the relative impact of context, prosody and facial ex-417
pression, each stimulus was associated with a binomial variable Context,418
Prosody and Facial expression, depending on which cue(s) were associated419
with the target. Note that our Sincere No items were unambiguously literal.420
It is possible, then, that participants realize, in the course of the experiment,421
that any answer starting with ‘No’ would lead to a non-ironic interpretation.422
In order to assess this possibility, we examined the effect of the linear Order423
of the stimuli.424
Accuracy. A correct interpretation of a target corresponds to a trial where425
the participant accurately selects the object the second character (B) in the426
video really wants (see the description of the stimuli). For Literal Yes items,427
the correct choice was the object named in the target (e.g. ‘Yes, you know428
how much I like physics!’), whereas in Literal No (e.g. ‘No, you know how429
much I hate physics!’) and Ironic items (e.g. ‘Yes, you know how much I430
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like physics!’), it was the other object displayed in the video. As can be seen431
























Figure 5: Proportions of correct responses by utterance Type (vertical bars represent
standard errors)
Binomial logistic multilevel models, with the by-participant random in-434
tercepts were implemented using the glmer function of the lme4 package435
(Bates et al., 2015). They revealed a significant effect of Type (Ironic vs.436
Literal Yes vs. Literal No; χ2(2) = 149.62, p < 0.001), as well as of Con-437
text (χ2(1) = 8.75, p = 0.003) and of Facial Expression (χ2(1) = 814.85,438
p = 0.001); there was no effect of Prosody (p = 0.14) and of Order (p = 0.21).439
Interactions between Type and Context (χ2(2) = 10.4, p < 0.007) and Type440
and Face (χ2(3) = 77.85, p < 0.001) were also significant. The model in441
Table 5 shows that Ironic targets elicit less correct responses than Literal442
No ones. The presence of Context strongly increases the accuracy on Ironic443
items. As for Facial expression, it has a detrimental effect on accuracy of444
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Ironic items; on the contrary, it increases the accuracy of Literal Yes relative445
to Ironic items.446
Accuracy
Intercept (Ironic) 0.45 (0.20)∗
Literal No 2.68 (0.46)∗∗∗
Literal Yes 0.05 (0.28)
Context
Ironic X Context 0.86 (0.20)∗∗∗
Literal No X Context −0.33 (0.45)
Literal Yes X Context 0.07 (0.24)
Facial expression
Ironic X Facial expression −0.44 (0.20)∗
Literal No X Facial expression 0.32 (0.41)
Literal Yes X Facial expression 1.98 (0.26)∗∗∗
Num. obs. 1578
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Coefficients (and standard errors) of fixed effects for the multilevel logistical
regression of correct responses on target Type, Type X Context & Type X Facial expression
Reaction times. In each target, the speaker’s preference was entirely deter-447
mined once the word was uttered referring to the object s/he wanted or pre-448
tended to want (‘Yes, you know how much I like physics!’). Reaction times449
were recorded from the onset of the word referring to an object in the target450
until participant’s response. A negative reaction time means that participant451
responded before the onset of the target word. Boxplots in Figure 6 suggest452
longer reaction times for Ironic targets. Linear multilevel regression models,453
with by-participant random intercepts and random slopes for the Type factor,454
were implemented with the lmer function of the lme4 package (Bates et al.,455
2015). They revealed a significant effect of Type (χ2(2) = 31.36, p < 0.001),456
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Prosody (χ2(1) = 11.85, p < 0.001), and Facial Expression (χ2(1) = 5.3,457
p = 0.021), but not of Context (p = 0.48). Interactions between Type and458
Prosody (χ2(1) = 8.45, p = 0.15) and between Type and Facial expression459
(χ2(2) = 21.166, p < 0.001) were also significant. Finally, there was also460
an effect of Order (χ2(1) = 146.87, p < 0.001), but no interaction between461
Order and Type (p = 0.61). The model, displayed in Table 6 reveals that462
responding to Ironic targets takes longer than for the other two types and463
that reaction times decrease along experimental trials. Both Prosody and464
Facial Expression decrease reaction times for Ironic items. (Prosody also de-465

















Figure 6: Tukey box-plots for reaction time per target type
Eye-Tracking data. We identified three areas of interest (AOI) for the target468
sentence segment using Tobii Studio software (version 3.2.1): the speaker’s469
face (eyes plus lips regions), the correct and the incorrect objects (see Figure470
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Reaction time
Intercept (Ironic) 3576.93 (220.77)∗∗∗
Literal No −1442.15 (174.05)∗∗∗
Literal Yes −754.39 (192.42)∗∗∗
Order −38.62 (3.07)∗∗∗
Prosody
Ironic X Prosody −564.82 (121.77)∗∗∗
Literal No X Prosody 216.16 (104.35)∗
Literal Yes X Prosody −321.43 (118.52)∗∗
Facial expression
Ironic X Facial expression −457.33 (117.80)∗∗∗
Literal No X Facial expression −143.85 (98.26)
Literal Yes X Facial expression 14.45 (112.48)
Num. groups: Subject 44
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 6: Coefficients (and standard errors) of fixed effects of the multilevel linear regression
of reaction time on target Type, Half , Type X Prosody & Type X Facial expression
7). The position of the AOI was manually adapted to the movements of471
the two actors in real time. Eye movement data for the target sentence472
segment was exported from Tobii using the I-VT fixation filter in the default473
setting. From the onset of the word referring to the object in the target,474
and for each AOI, we calculated the total fixation duration (i.e. the sum475
of the duration for all fixations within an AOI) and the fixation count (i.e.476
the number of times the participant fixates on an AOI). The fixation count477
and the total fixation duration were normalised according to participants’478
reaction times. For instance, number of fixations for the AOI ‘correct object’479
= ([number of fixations on the correct object / time between the beginning of480
the target word until participant’s response] ∗ 1000). We also coded whether481
participants’ first three fixations went to the correct object, both from the482
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onset of the target utterance and from the onset of the word referring to the483
object in the target.484
Figure 7: Areas of interest (AOIs) for the target sentence segment: the speaker’s face (eyes
plus lips regions), the correct and incorrect objects.
A linear mixed model on proportion of fixation durations with random485
by-participant intercepts revealed a significant effect of AOI (χ2(2) = 112.77,486
p < 0.001), as well as a significant AOI X Type interaction (χ2(6) = 24.87,487
p < 0.001). There was no interaction between AOI and Context, AOI and488
Prosody, and AOI and Facial expression (all ps > 0.14). A linear mixed489
model on proportion of fixation counts with random by-participant intercepts490
also revealed a significant effect of AOI (χ2(2) = 69.12, p < 0.001) and a491
significant AOI and Type (χ2(6) = 23.76, p < 0.001). Additionally, there492
was a weak interaction between AOI and Context (χ2(3) = 8.69, p = 0.034),493
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but no interaction between AOI and Prosody (p = 0.88), between AOI and494
Facial expression (p = 0.086), and between AOI, Type and Context (p = 0.4).495
As can be seen from the model summaries in Table 7, the most relevant result496
– which is also fairly consistent with accuracy data – from fixation duration497
and counts is that Literal No targets attracted longer and more numerous498





Intercept(Correct Object) 4.96 (2.64) 9.19 (3.04)∗∗
Incorrect Object −0.51 (2.63) −3.34 (3.42)
Speaker’s face 11.37 (2.28)∗∗∗ 8.94 (2.96)∗∗
Type
Correct Object X Literal Yes 2.70 (2.64) 2.94 (2.64)
Incorrect Object X Literal Yes −1.23 (2.64) −1.19 (2.64)
Speaker’s face X Literal Yes 2.06 (1.87) 1.55 (1.87)
Correct Object X Literal No 11.76 (2.66)∗∗∗ 11.92 (2.66)∗∗∗
Incorrect Object X Literal No 1.21 (2.66) 1.43 (2.66)
Speaker’s face X Literal No 3.03 (1.88) 1.73 (1.88)
Correct Object X Context −3.85 (2.30)
Incorrect Object X Context −0.46 (2.30)
Speaker’s face X Context −3.93 (1.63)∗
Num. obs. 5609 5608
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 7: Coefficients (and standard errors) of fixed effects of the multilevel linear regression
of proportions of fixation durations and fixation counts on AOI, AOI X target Type, &
AOI X Context
Turning to the first three fixations on the correct object from the be-500
ginning of the target utterance, binomial multilevel models, with the by-501
participant random intercepts revealed an effect of Type (χ2(2) = 35.56,502
29
p < 0.001), but no effect of Context, Prosody or Facial expression (all503
ps > 0.06). There was also an effect of the Fixation Number (first, sec-504
ond or third; χ2(1) = 32.93, p < 0.001), as well as interaction between Type505
and Fixation Number (χ2(3) = 36.16, p < 0.001).506
For the first three fixations on the correct object, computed from the507
beginning of the word referring to the object, binomial multilevel models,508
with the by-participant random intercepts also revealed an effect of Type509
(χ2(2) = 19.17, p < 0.001) on the fixation on the correct object, but no510
effect of Context, Prosody or Facial expression (all ps > 0.21). Here too,511
there was an effect of Fixation Number (χ2(1) = 123.02, p < 0.001), as well as512
interaction between Type and Fixation Number (χ2(3) = 125.03, p < 0.001).513
As can be seen from Table 8, from the start of the target utterance, Literal514
Yes – but not Literal No – items attract more anticipatory fixations to the515
correct object than Ironic. Towards the end of the target utterance, however,516
Literal No items – but not Literal Yes – are more likely to attract anticipatory517
looks towards the correct object than Ironic items. For both measures (i.e.518
target utterance and object mention), the probability to look at the correct519
object increases from the first to the third fixation for all item types.520
Discussion521
Correct identification of the speaker’s goals is significantly lower for ironic522
utterances; in that respect, our results parallel findings by Kowatch et al.523
(2013), who used analogous utterance Types. Equally consistent with the524
literature (e.g. Kreuz & Roberts, 1995; Gerrig & Goldvarg, 2000) is our result525
that incongruence with the preceding context increases the correct interpre-526






Intercept (Ironic) −5.30 (0.54)∗∗∗ −3.90 (0.32)∗∗∗
Literal Yes 1.42 (0.59)∗ 0.39 (0.41)
Literal No 0.03 (0.67) 0.78 (0.38)∗
Fixation number
Ironic X Fixation number 0.58 (0.22)∗∗ 0.80 (0.13)∗∗∗
Literal Yes X Fixation number 0.45 (0.14)∗∗∗ 0.72 (0.12)∗∗∗
Literal No X Fixation number 0.76 (0.18)∗∗∗ 0.71 (0.11)∗∗∗
Num. obs. 3905 3402
Num. groups: Subject 43 43
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 8: Fixed effects of the multilevel logistic regression of first fixations on the correct
object (beginning from start the target utterance and from the start of the word referring
to an object) target Type & Type X Fixation Number (first, second or third).
interpretation, and ironic facial expression actually hampers it, confirming528
that non-contextual cues for irony are not very reliable in a comprehension529
task.530
We also found that ironic items elicit slower reaction times relative to531
the literal ones. Slower processing of ironic items, to a certain extent at532
least, is probably linked to the contextual assessment and rejection of the533
compositional, literal meanings (Giora, 2003). However, Experiment 2 also534
strongly suggests that context-based processing of irony may be aborted in535
the presence of a distinctive prosody and/or facial expression. A striking re-536
sult, which is consistent with our predictions, is that both ironic prosody and537
ironic facial cues dramatically decrease reaction times. Together, accuracy538
and reaction times results indicate that non-contextual cues entail a trade-off539
in irony interpretation. On the one hand, they are less reliable than context,540
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but, on the other hand, their presence prompts a faster processing. One541
explanation of this effect, in line with the model proposed by Kissine (2016),542
is that, in the presence of distinctive prosody and/or facial expression par-543
ticipants by-pass contextual interpretation of the literal meaning. Another,544
very similar interpretation is that both contextual and non-contextual cues545
are processed in parallel, but that the latter lead to faster decision, thus546
terminating the former. This finding is coherent with the parallel-constraint-547
satisfaction account (Katz, 2005; Pexman, 2008), but allows to go a step548
further in evidencing the relative weight of the different cues in irony com-549
prehension. Note that, unlike us, Kowatch et al. (2013) found no difference550
in reaction times between ironic and literal items. Recall, however, that their551
stimuli were all associated with ironic prosody and no contextual cues. To552
the extent that prosody prompts faster (but less accurate) processing, this553
feature may explain the difference between their and our results.554
Another clear-cut result of Experiment 2 is the advantage in processing555
for literal (‘No’) negative sentences. These items led to strikingly higher accu-556
racy rates and faster response times. Likewise, these items were associated557
with longer and more numerous fixations on the correct object, reflecting558
lesser hesitation as to the response. Further evidence for the advantage of559
Literal No items comes from first fixations. At the beginning of the target560
utterance, more looks go to the correct object in literal positive items, which561
is certainly due to the spill-over from the mention of the correct object in562
the preceding question (see Figure 1 and Table 1). However, by the time563
the object is mentioned in the target, literal negative utterances trigger more564
anticipatory looks towards the correct object. One reason why Literal No565
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items stand apart could be that in our design all ironic items were associ-566
ated with positive (‘Yes’) sentences. However, neither accuracy nor reaction567
times for negative sentences change across the experiment, as revealed by568
the absence of the interaction between Type and Order. There is another569
reason why participants implicitly grasped the unambiguously literal nature570
of Literal No items. Irony is usually associated with negatively oriented read-571
ings of positive literal counterparts, whereas the opposite, ironic positive /572
literal negative valence is highly atypical (Kreuz & Link, 2002). One may573
surmise, then, that interpreters’ language experience makes them sensitive to574
irony’s negative valence. If so, our participants could rapidly associate nega-575
tive sentences with a non-ironic interpretation, without necessarily assessing576
the literal content relative to the context, or, for that matter, processing577
any other cue. In line with this idea, even though in Experiment 1 negative578
prosody was the most clearly distinguished from ironic, in Experiment 2 it579
tended to slow down reaction times. That is, information provided by literal580
negative prosody is made redundant by the negative valence of the sentence.581
Returning to our main research questions, Experiment 2 strongly suggests582
that, as hypothesised in the Introduction, ironic prosody and facial expression583
are less reliable cues for irony comprehension than contextual incongruence,584
but that they entail an accuracy-processing speed trade-off. However, three585
methodological choices we made could be taken to somehow mitigate these586
results. First, recall that we decided not to include a condition with Facial587
expression, but no Prosody and Context. While the results of Experiment 2588
indicate that ironic Facial expression is not a fully reliable cue for the inter-589
pretation of ironic utterances, this cue was always associated with at least590
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another one. Second, our decision not to include Ironic No items (viz. ironic591
compliments), albeit fully justified from a methodological point of view (see592
above), entails an unbalanced experimental design, with more positive (Ironic593
and Literal Yes) than negative (Literal No) items. Third, we compared the594
reliability of a prosodic or contextual cue delivered alone or in combination595
with one or two other cues, but at no time these conditions were compared596
to a complete absence of cues. Adding a control condition without any cues597
would allow to appreciate more closely the reliability of isolated cues. Even598
though none of these three features is likely to impact the differential pro-599
cessing roles of contextual and non-contextual cues uncovered in Experiment600
2, we seek to determine, in Experiment 3, whether these effects are robust601
enough to show up in a fully balanced design.602
Experiment 3603
In Experiment 3 we seek to replicate the effects uncovered in Experiment604
2 using a perfectly balanced, between-subject design, while keeping exactly605
the same target sentences segments as in Experiments 1 and 2. In order to606
rule out any potential bias due to the presence of literal negative items, we607
kept only the Literal Yes and Ironic items of Experiment 2.5 Using these608
5 In theory, we could have balanced our design by adding negative ironic items. To begin
with, such a design would have considerably increased the task duration, and hence the
risk of biases due to cognitive fatigue. More importantly, and as already discussed above,
negative ironic items are highly atypical (Kreuz & Link, 2002), and poorly comprehended
even in discrimination tasks, which arguably are easier than our act-out paradigm (Climie
& Pexman, 2008; Filippova & Astington, 2010). Interpretation of this less common type
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items, we created two sets of stimuli – Context vs. No Context – presented609
to two different groups of participants. Stimuli presented to the Context610
Group included all possible combinations of Context with non-contextual611
cues: Context; Context and Facial expression; Context and Prosody; and612
Context, Prosody and Facial expression. Stimuli presented to the No Con-613
text Group pooled all combinations of non-contextual cues in the absence of614
Context: No cue; Prosody; Facial expression; Prosody and Facial expression.615
In this way, Experiment 3 provides a balanced design suited to isolate the im-616
pact of all three cues, and includes a condition with only a facial-expression617
cue and a control condition without any cues.618
This between-subject design also allows to further test our Hypothesis619
2. In line with Experiment 2, we expect an overall effect of Group (Context620
vs. No Context) on accuracy: in the absence of contextual cues, partici-621
pants should be more error prone in gauging the speaker’s ironic intent. If,622
as we hypothesise, processing of non-contextual cues is privileged at the ex-623
pense of context-based assessment of the utterance content, the presence of624
ironic prosody and/or facial expression should lead to comparable accuracy in625
both Context and No Context groups. Furthermore, we also predict contex-626
tual processing not to be completed in the presence of these non-contextual627
cues. Accordingly, the presence of the non-contextual cues lead to shorter628
response times in both groups, which would indicate, in the Context group,629
that contextual processing has been aborted. If, by contrast, non-contextual630
cues supplement full processing of contextual cues, one should expect ironic631
of irony is thus a topic orthogonal to the relative roles of contextual and non-contextual
cues, and clearly falls out of the scope of this paper.
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prosody and facial expression to increase accuracy in the Context group, and632
to lead to longer response times.633
Participants634
Fourty-seven undergraduate students, none of whom took part in Experi-635
ments 1 and 2 , participated for monetary reward in Experiment 3. Inclusion636
criteria were similar to Experiment 2. One participant was excluded from sta-637
tistical analyses for technical reasons. The Context group (N=23) consisted638
of 13 women and 10 men between 19 and 29 years (m = 22.70; sd = 2.60),639
and the No Context group consisted of 15 women and 8 men between 20 and640
28 years (m = 22.83; sd = 2.50).641
Procedure642
Two groups of sixteen videos from the previous set of videos were used643
to form the Context and No Context group. Target sentences in the Context644
group were always associated with a Contextual cue and were subdivided645
in 4 categories depending on the presence (+) or the absence (-) of prosody646
and/or facial expression cues: Context only (C+P-F-), Context & Prosody647
(C+P+F-), Context & Facial expression (C+P-F+), Context, Prosody &648
Facial expression (C+P+F+) conditions. In the No Context group, the tar-649
get sentence was never associated with a Contextual cue; stimuli were also650
subdivided in 4 categories depending on the presence (+) or absence (-) of651
prosody and facial expression cues: No cues (C-P-F-), Prosody only (C-P+F-652
), Facial expression only (C-P-F+), Prosody & Facial expression (C-P+F+)653
conditions. Each category is composed of 2 Ironic and 2 Literal Yes items654
(see Table 9).655
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Group Context No Context
Context Prosody Facial expression Context Prosody Facial expression
+ - - - - -
+ + - - + -
+ - + - - +
+ + + - + +
Table 9: Design of Experiment 3
To obtain the items in the No cues (C-P-F-) and in the Facial expres-656
sion only (C-P-F+) conditions, we used the same videos as in the Context657
only and Context & Facial expression conditions from the Context group,658
removing the context segment from the videos.659
Results660
In order to uncover the roles of ironic prosody and facial expression, as661
in Experiment 2, we associated each item with binomial Prosody and Facial662
Expression factor, depending on which cue(s) were associated with the target.663
Accuracy. Figure 8 displays the proportions of correct responses by Group,664
Type and non-contextual cue. Accuracy was analyzed building hierarchical665
binomial logistic multilevel models, with the by-participant random inter-666
cepts, using the glmer function of the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015). As667
predicted, there was a significant effect of Group (Context vs. No Con-668
text; χ2(1) = 7.94, p < 0.005). There was also an effect of Type (Literal669
vs. Ironic; χ2(1) = 5.78, p < 0.001), but no Group X Type interaction670
(p = 0.42). There was no effect of Prosody (p = 0.17), but an effect of671
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Facial expression (χ2(1) = 36.2, p < 0.001). The Type X Facial expression672
interaction was significant (χ2(1) = 8.32, p < 0.004), but not the Group X673
Facial expression (p = 0.49). That is, ironic prosody and facial expression674
have a comparable effect in both groups, indicating that their presence does675
not have a cumulative effect on accuracy in the Context group.676
In order to assess further our predictions, we conducted post-hoc com-677
parisons of least square-means on the final model. As predicted, overall678
accuracy is significantly lower in the No Context group (β = −0.53, se =679
0.18, p = 0.0036). Overall accuracy was higher on Ironic than on Literal680
items (β = 0.6, se = 17, p = 0.0005). In other terms, in this irony compre-681
hension task, the rate of false alarms exceeds misses.6682
Reaction times. As in Experiment 2, reaction times were recorded from the683
onset of the word referring to an object in the target until participant’s684
response. Response times, per Group, Type and non-contextual cue are685
summarised in Figure 9. Linear multilevel regressions, with by-participant686
random intercepts revealed no effect of Group or of Type (ps> 0.7). However,687
there was an effect of Prosody (χ2(1) = 5.38, p < 0.02) and Facial expression688
(χ2(1) = 5.58, p = 0.018). As predicted, reaction times were shorter in the689
presence of Prosody (β = −335.1, se = 144, p < 0.02) and Facial expression690
(β = −344, se = 145.4, p = 0.018), across Groups and Type.7691
6The Type X Facial expression interaction it was due to the fact that literal marked
Facial expression improved accuracy on Literal items (viz. reduces the rate of false alarms;
β = 1.46, se = 0.24, p < 0.0001).
7Using the same method as in Experiment 2 and the same AOIs (see Figure 7), we
also analysed total fixation durations and fixation counts. Hierarchical multilevel linear
38

















































Figure 8: Proportions of correct responses per group, target type and non-contextual cue
(vertical bars represent standard errors)
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Figure 9: Tukey box-plots for reaction time per group, target type and non-contextual cue
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Discussion692
Results of our Experiment 3 are entirely consistent with those of Exper-693
iment 2, and provide supplementary confirmation for our hypotheses. To694
begin with, we confirm that contextual incongruence is a much more reliable695
cue for irony than ironic intonation and facial expression. That is, in line with696
Experiment 2, high discriminability of these cues, evidenced in Experiment697
1, does not translate into comparable reliability in an act-out comprehension698
task.699
Furthermore, in Experiment 3 ironic prosody and/or facial expression do700
not have a cumulative effect with contextual incongruence; if they did, their701
presence should have entailed higher accuracy in the context group. This702
result suggests that, as predicted by our Hypothesis 2, intonation and/or fa-703
cial expression are salient cues that prompt interpreters to terminate costlier704
context-based processing. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that,705
as in Experiment 2, ironic prosody and facial expression are associated with706
a processing speed-accuracy trade-off. That is, in spite of being less re-707
liable than contextual incongruence for irony comprehension, the presence708
of prosody and/or facial expression is associated, in both Context and No709
Context groups, with shorter response times.710
regressions with by-participant random intercept revealed an effect of AOI on total fixation
durations (χ2(2) = 113.58, p < 0.001). However, there is no interaction with Group, Type,
Prosody and Facial expression (all ps> 0.38). As for fixation counts, there was no effect
of AOI (p = 0.16). These data are orthogonal to the main point of Experiment 3 and will
not be discussed further on.
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General discussion711
While ironic prosody and facial cues can be accurately categorized in a712
discrimination task (Experiment 1), they do not lead to better grasp of irony713
in a task where participants must make a decision about the speaker’s com-714
municative goals (Experiments 2 and 3). An obvious upshot of our paper,715
then, is methodological. Researchers should be wary of drawing conclusions716
about figurative language comprehension based on forced-choice categoriza-717
tion tasks. The asymmetry between discrimination and use is probably due718
to the fact that perceptual thresholds between ironic vs. non-ironic prosody719
and facial expression are not entirely clear-cut. This was made clear by the720
irony ratings in Experiment 1, which showed that literal positive and neu-721
tral cues are perceived as more ironic than their negative counterparts. The722
relative fuzziness of these boundaries has probably less importance in a task723
where participants have to focus exclusively on locating audio or video stim-724
uli on an irony scale, but they can lead to more incorrect responses when725
participants have to make decisions on speaker’s goals. In other terms, cat-726
egorization of ironic prosody and facial cues can be carried out off-line, but727
is much more difficult on-line.728
A potential limitation here could be our use of professional actors in the729
video stimuli. Although it is a standard practice in the literature on irony730
(e.g. Rockwell, 2000; Anolli et al., 2000; Attardo et al., 2003; Rankin et al.,731
2009), there is a risk that prosody and facial expression may have been over-732
played. Recall, however, that results of Experiment 1 did not show any ceiling733
effect in rating score of prosody and facial expression, and that they led to734
far from perfect detection of irony in Experiments 2 and 3. To the best of735
42
our knowledge, no study compares prosody and facial expression associated736
with ironic statements in actors, untrained confederates or in spontaneous737
speech. One study of acoustic correlates of spontaneous verbal irony reports738
slower delivery rate as the only robust prosodic characteristic of ironic ut-739
terances (Bryant, 2010). A slowdown in speech rate has also been reported740
in studies using actors (Rockwell, 2000; Anolli et al., 2000), as well as in the741
current paper. It would be interesting to replicate our findings using record-742
ings of verbal irony in real life situations. However, studying the interplay743
between ironic cues requires to tightly control the structure of the context744
segment and the target sentence, which is extremely difficult to achieve in745
real situations.746
The trade-off between accuracy and reaction times, which emerged from747
Experiments 2 and 3, might look very much like a conceptual conundrum.748
On the one hand, it seems clear that neither ironic prosody nor ironic fa-749
cial expression form natural kinds (in line with Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005);750
on the other hand, participants do seem to privilege such cues, at the ex-751
pense of accuracy, whenever these are available. On second thought, however,752
the contradiction is only apparent. Any definition of irony, be it framed in753
terms of echo or pretence, includes the incompatibility between the context754
and a literal interpretation of the utterance (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995;755
Wilson, 2006). This is why the capacity to distinguish lies from jokes is756
operational only if one can make context-based hypotheses about what the757
speaker wanted the hearer to believe (Wimmer & Leekam, 1991; Martin &758
McDonald, 2004). It is also for this reason that, as shown by Experiments759
2 and 3, assessing the utterance content relative to the background context760
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remains the most reliable route to grasp ironic meanings. In that sense,761
contextual assessment of the literal meaning is, indeed, an essential part of762
irony processing, as predicted, for instance, by Giora (2003) and Sperber &763
Wilson (2002). Yet, even though our results vindicate the central role of764
context in irony comprehension, they also indicate, consistently with the sec-765
ond prediction made in the Introduction, that irony processing is not always766
context-based. One may speculate that along with our communicative expe-767
rience, grows implicit knowledge that ironic utterances are often accompanied768
by distinctive prosody or facial expression. Mature communicators may then769
privilege (what they perceive as) ironic prosody and/or facial expression to770
speed up the comprehension process. That is, unreliable as they are, these771
non-contextual cues lead to an activation of ironic meanings without the772
full-fledged, compositional interpretation being completed.773
Such a processing route is fully compatible with the Direct Access model774
(Gibbs, 2002). It can also be implemented within the parallel-constraint-775
satisfaction model (Katz, 2005; Pexman, 2008), provided that this model is776
amended in way to allow salient non-contextual cues to terminate context-777
based processing before it is complete. In a way, then, our findings lay ground778
for reconciling these two models with more context-based theories of irony.779
It is generally plausible that frugal heuristics are privileged by interpreters780
whenever possible (in line with, for instance, Ferreira & Patson 2007; Shintel781
& Keysar 2009; Epley et al. 2004; Kissine 2016). Assessing the utterance782
content to the context is a relatively complex, and arguably costly process,783
so it is not entirely surprising that interpreters forgo it in the presence of784
more salient cues (as also evidenced by Deliens et al., 2017).785
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Participants’ failure to see that prosody and facial expression are not as786
reliable as context-based assessment can be profitably conceived of as an in-787
stance of meta-cognitive error (in the sense of, e.g., Koriat, 2000; Proust,788
2013). According to Kissine (2016), context – understood, this time, as the789
entire interactional frame of the utterance, including intonation and/or fa-790
cial expression – plays a two-pronged role in pragmatic processing. On the791
one hand, it determines the interpretative goal, including, for instance, the792
level of the specificity of the interpretation output. On the other hand, it793
is used to monitor and control the interpretation process that has been de-794
termined by this goal. For instance, the interpretative goal in Experiment 1795
consists in mere discrimination of an ironic or not character of a stimulus,796
which is less complex than genuinely accessing the speaker’s intention, as797
in Experiments 2 and 3. Such a superficial ironic interpretation may thus798
be reached without attempting to assess the speaker’s intentions. However,799
non-contextual processes are less reliable to achieve the more complex in-800
terpretation goals mandated by the tasks in Experiments 2 and 3. Relying801
on ironic prosody and/or facial expression in these cases, at the expense of802
context-based processing, thus reflects a meta-cognitive bias, driven by cog-803
nitive economy principles, which leads participants to select an interpretation804
process less than optimally suited for the interpretative goal at hand.805
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